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 4 
Introduction 
 
 
 
“[The Moroccan Dutch community in the Netherlands] does not have [a 
Turkish governmental institute that deals with religious affairs like] 
Diyanet as the Turkish [Dutch] community has, but still the influence of 
Morocco on Moroccan mosques in the Netherlands is significant. With 
the advent of the holy month of Ramadan, the [Moroccan] government 
will send hundreds of imams again. They will speak about the protests 
and will proclaim the government’s stance.”1  
Abdou Menebhi, President of Euro-
Mediterraan Centrum Migratie en 
Ontwikkeling. 
 
As long as Moroccan Dutch migrants have been present in the 
Netherlands, discussions have been taking place about the influence of 
Morocco in the religious sphere in the Netherlands.2 During the protests in 
the Rif in Morocco in 2016 and 2017, Moroccan Dutch nationals3 have re-
evoked these discussions about this influence on Moroccan Dutch mosques.4 
They responded to an imam in Amsterdam that preached that the Moroccan 
protesters spread discord in the country and were therefore sinful. On 
several occasions in these discussions, Moroccan Dutch nationals, like 
Abdou Menebhi, have characterized mosques in the Netherlands to be the 
tool through which Morocco exercises influences in the political and religious 
                                                
1 “In het verweer tegen de lange arm van Rabat,” DeKanttekening, my translation, accessed on July 14, 
2 Nadia Bouras, “Het Land van Herkomst: Perspectieven op Verbondenheid met Marokko, 1960-2010” 
(PhD Diss., Universiteit Leiden, 2012), 1-12, 128. 
3 This concerns a first, second and third generation migrant group that migrated to the Netherlands from 
the 1960’s on. Since it is impossible to eleminate the Moroccan nationality the naturalized group and 
descendants have two nationalities: the Moroccan one and the Dutch one. In this thesis, I will use the 
term “Moroccan Dutch” to refer to this group that has both nationalities and is situated in the 
Netherlands.  
4 These initiatives have been discussed extensively in Dutch media. See: 
“In het verweer tegen de lange arm van Rabat;”  
“Rif Alert! Helpt Marokkaanse Nederlanders tegen ‘lange arm van Rabat,” NOS, accessed on July 14, 
2017, http://nos.nl/artikel/2178473-rif-alert-helpt-marokkaanse-nederlanders-tegen-lange-arm-van-
rabat.html; 
“De lange arm van Rabat strekt tot Den Haag,” Den Haag Centraal, accessed on July 14, 2017, 
http://denhaagcentraal.net/2791/a-de-lange-arm-van-rabat-strekt-tot-den-haaga. 
See here the Friday Sermon in the Al-Ihsane mosque in Amsterdam in June 2017: 
“Lmakhzan imozar,” Youtube, accessed on July 14, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WGgZpesT6Oc&feature=youtu.be. 
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domain.5 Menebhi and others claim Morocco does so by organizing meetings 
in the Netherlands, by influencing mosque board members and by sending 
imams during Ramadan each year. On the other hand, members of 
Moroccan Dutch mosque organizations have denied such allegations and 
state that the such influence from the state is absent.6  
 
 On the surface, it might appear that Morocco has a large influence on 
some mosques with largely Moroccan Dutch attendees in the Netherlands 
because of similar ideas. The official Moroccan Islam entails following the 
Malikite school of law, Asharite tradition of theology and Sufism.7 At the 
same time, some mosques are known to outspokenly preach the same 
traditions. Two examples of such mosques with largely Moroccan Dutch 
attendees are Masjid El-Islam in The Hague and Islamitisch Centrum Imam 
Malik in Leiden.8 Both the Moroccan state and the two mosques in the 
Netherlands produce discourses on reasons for following these specific 
traditions and how they relate to the national Moroccan identity. This raises 
the question of what the influence of Morocco is on these mosques in 
advocating a certain Islamic tradition. At the same time, the discourses on 
Islam of the Moroccan state and the two mentioned mosques are 
characterized by different national contexts, wider ongoing debates and 
positions of power within the wider society. This begs a second valid 
question as to how similar or dissimilar these discourses are.  
 
Background 
  
These Moroccan and Moroccan Dutch discourses about the 
importance of following the Malikite school of law, Asharite tradition of 
                                                
5 “In het verweer tegen de lange arm van Rabat;”  
“De lange arm van Rabat: Spanning in Nederland duidelijk merkbaar,” Elsevier Weekblad, accessed on 
July 14, 2017, http://www.elsevierweekblad.nl/nederland/achtergrond/2017/06/marokko-de-lange-arm-
van-rabat-96725w/; 
“De lange arm van Rabat strekt tot Den Haag.” 
6 “Reactie op negatieve berichtgeving in de media,” Al-Ihsane, accessed on July 14, 2017, http://al-
ihsane.nl/reactie-op-negatieve-berichtgeving-in-de-media/; 
Bouras, “Het Land van Herkomst,” 1-12, 128. 
7 Mohammed El-Katiri, “The Institutionalization of Religious Affairs: religious reform in Morocco,” The 
Journal of North African Studies 18:1 (2013): 53 
8 “I’la ̄n ‘an Dawwara Shar’iyya ash-Shama ̄’il al-Muh ̣ammadiyya,” Islamitisch Centrum Imam Malik 
Leiden, accessed on December 20, 2015, http://www.icimleiden.nl/agenda/item/نﻥاﺍلﻝعﻉإﺇ-نﻥعﻉ-ةﺓرﺭوﻭدﺩ-ةﺓيﻱعﻉرﺭشﺵ-يﻱفﻑ-
لﻝئﺉاﺍمﻡشﺵلﻝاﺍ-يﻱدﺩمﻡحﺡمﻡلﻝاﺍ/; 
“Over ons,” Moskee El Islam, accessed on February 4, 2017, http://newsite.moskeeelislam.nl/over-ons/. 
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theology and certain forms of Sufism form part of a larger global 
conversation among some groups of Muslims. These three traditions within 
Islam fit within the wider framework of madhhab traditionalism.9 In this 
thesis, I will use the term madhhab traditionalism to refer to the belief that 
true religious authority and true understanding of Islam is to be found 
within the classical Islamic institutions of the schools of law, theology and 
Sufi guilds.10 Well-known contemporary Muslim scholars like Hamza Yusuf, 
Zaid Shakir, Ingrid Mattson from the United States, Abdal-Hakim Murad 
from Great Britain and Ali Gomaa from Egypt have all pleaded for this 
‘return’ to Islamic traditions of scholarship and the re-claiming of the 
authority of the schools of law.11 Hamza Yusuf criticized the lack of scholarly 
tradition among contemporary Muslims when he stated that Muslims “are 
living through a reformation, but without any theologians to guide us 
through it.”12 In August 2016, an important event in the framework of 
madhhab traditionalism took place when a group of scholars gathered in 
Chechnya to define what a true Muslim is. They had stated that the Ahl as-
sunna are followers of the Asharite or Maturidite school in terms of theology 
and the Hanafite, Malikite, Shafi’ite or Hanbalite school in terms of law and 
Sufis who adhere to Imam al-Junayd’s path in terms of ethics and 
practices.13 In 2010, a young Moroccan-French rapper released a popular 
rap song on YouTube about the need to return to trusting scholarly 
authority when he rapped “Alif baa taa thaa: qui vient d'apprendre à lire ne 
peut enseigner, Khalife mode beta: qui veut pouvoir courir doit savoir 
marcher.”14  
 
These examples illustrate a larger development within some groups 
of the Muslim community in which the believers protest against the 
declining scholarly authority and Islamic traditionalism. This tendency is not 
                                                
9 Not to be confused with Traditionalist theology, which is a movement that rejects rationalistic theology 
in favor of strict textualism in interpreting the Quran. This movement came up at the end of the eight 
century. 
10 Jonathan Brown, The Canonization of al-Bukhari and Muslim: The Formation and Function of the Sunni 
Hadith Cannon (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 305. 
11 Stephen Jones, “New Labour and the Re-making of British Islam: The Case of the Radical Middle Way 
and the “Reclamation of the Classical Islamic Tradition,” Religions 4 (2013): 559-560. 
12 “If you hate the west, emigrate to a Muslim country,” The Guardian, accessed on December 21, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/08/religion.uk. 
13 “Who are the Ahl al-sunna?” Chechnya Conference, accessed on May 2, 2017, 
http://chechnyaconference.org/material/chechnya-conference-statement-english.pdf. 
14 “Médine - #Faisgafatwa (Official Clip),” YouTube, accessed on May 2, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aOIanQk4Y3M. 
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restricted to individual believers and authorities; some governments, such 
as Algeria, Pakistan, Great Britain and Morocco, also promote the authority 
of scholarly tradition and Sufism for their Muslim populations in order to 
fight ideas associated with Salafism and extremism.15 
 
Madhhab Traditionalism 
 
In matters of following the ‘true’ authority, madhhab traditionalism is 
opposed to the tradition also known as Salafism that generally rejects the 
authority of the schools of law and supports the idea of “returning to the 
original sources” in which the Quran and the sunna are directly consulted in 
order to draw conclusions about Islam. The term Salafism is based on the 
“salaf”, which are the first three generations after the prophet 
Mohammed,16 and consequently disregards the generations of scholars who 
came after these ‘salaf’ and who developed into schools of learning known 
as madhhabs. The term Salafism is widely used in popular media and 
politics as the term for a conservative or ultra-orthodox Islam. This is not a 
valid definition, since the term covers a variety of religious phenomena. It 
should be taken into account that academic disagreement exists about 
whether the term Salafism covers a unified phenomenon and that its 
followers can again be subdivided into several different ideologies. 
Nevertheless, all subdivisions of Salafism have come into existence because 
of a countermovement against madhhab traditionalism and its ideas of the 
true Islamic authority of scholars and Sufi masters. 17  The manifold 
discussions between these ‘two camps’ are often on the subject of the 
definitions of committing bid’a, shirk, kufr and whether the other is 
following the ‘true’ authority.18 As a result, it is safe to say that there is an 
opposition between Salafism and madhhab traditionalism in matters of 
understanding authority. Even though the reality is more complex than a 
mere traditionalist-salafist dichotomy, the presence of harsh polemics back 
                                                
15 Fait Muedini, Sponsoring Sufism: How Governments Promote “Mystical Islam” in their Domestic and 
Foreign Policies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 1-18. 
16 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
25. 
17 Brown, The Canonization of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, 1-23. 
18 Ibid, 1-23. 
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and forth cannot be denied.19 In practice, however, the average Muslim is 
not always aware of such an existing opposition.  
 
Madhhab Traditionalism in Morocco and the Netherlands 
 
The Moroccan government is a well-known example of a state that 
sponsors madhhab traditionalism.20 In its policies, Morocco has continuously 
declared Sufism, the Malikite school of law and Asharite theological tradition 
as cornerstones of its Islamic and Moroccan identity. It effectuates this 
policy by establishing educational institutes, institutionalizing religion, 
absorbing religious authority into the state structure, screening religious 
activities and producing a narrative of the ‘official Moroccan Islam’, in which 
a reconstruction of the madhhab traditionalist approach and accompanying 
Sufi practices have the largest share.21 This official Moroccan Islam legally 
applies to all Moroccan nationals, including the diaspora communities in 
Europe. 
 
In the Netherlands, a similar trend is noticeable among Moroccan 
Dutch Muslim communities. A number of Muslim scholars and imams of 
Moroccan origin who live in the Netherlands started the Sunni Instituut, an 
                                                
19 Basheer Nafi, “The Rise of Islamic Reformist Thought and Its Challenge to Traditional Islam,” in 
Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century, ed. Suha Taji-Farouki and Basheer M. Nafi (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2004) 3-10; 
Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defense, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern 
World (Surrey, UK: Curzon, 1999). 
This interesting phenomenon of polemics between, for instance, scholars of Ash’ari and Wahhabi 
theology can be widely found on fatwa websites: 
“Wahhabism & Salafism,” Ashari Assemble, accessed on December 30, 2015, 
http://asharisassemble.com/wahhabism-salafism/; 
“Who or What is a Salafi?” Seekers Hub, accessed on December 30, 2015, http://seekershub.org/ans-
blog/2015/08/26/who-or-what-is-a-salafi/; 
“Learning from Ash’ari Shaykhs,” IslamQA, accessed on 30 december 2015:, 
http://islamqa.info/en/10693; 
“The Ash’ari School,” IslamWeb, accessed on December 30, 2015, 
http://www.islamweb.net/emainpage/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=27552.  
20 El-Katiri, “The Institutionalization of Religious Affairs,” 53;  
Isabelle Werenfels, “Beyond Authoritarian Upgrading: The re-emergence of Sufi Orders in Maghrebi 
Politics,” The Journal of North African Studies 19 (2014): 275;  
Muedini, Sponsoring Sufism, 1-18. 
21 Carol Migdalovitz, “Morocco: Current Issues,” Congressional Research Service (December 20, 2010): 
6-8; 
El-Katiri, “The Institutionalization of Religious Affairs,” 53; 
Aziz el Kobaiti Idrissi, “The Political Participation of Sufi and Salafi Movements in Modern Morocco: 
Between the ‘2003 Casablanca Terrorist Attack’ and the ‘Moroccan Spring’,” in Sufis and Salafis in the 
Contemporary Age, ed. Lloyd Ridgeon (Londen: Bloomsbury, 2015), 92-93;  
Driss Maghraoui, “The Strengths and Limits of Religious Reforms in Morocco,” Mediterranean Politics 
14:2 (2009): 197;  
Malika Zeghal, Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism and Electoral Politics, translated by 
George Holoch (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2008), 250-255. 
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institute that advocates the need for Dutch Muslims to follow one of the four 
madhhabs and gain knowledge about Islam through the teachings of that 
madhhab.22 Another example is Kennishuys, a publishing company founded 
in the Netherlands in 2014 that aims to produce and translate books from 
scholarly literature in the tradition of the madhhabs, as a reaction to the 
wide availability of Islamic sources that do not recognize the authority of 
the madhhabs.23 Two mosques, Masjid El-Islam in The Hague (hereafter: 
“El-Islam”) and Islamitisch Centrum Imam Malik in Leiden (hereafter: 
“Imam Malik”), are part of the same advocacy for madhhab traditionalism. 
Both are known to preach a Malikite, Asharite and Sufi discourse and both 
identify themselves as Morocco-oriented because of the large proportion of 
attendees with a Moroccan origin.24 These two mosques will be the objects 
of this thesis. 
 
Research question 
 
The discourse of these two mosques is close to the official discourse 
of the Moroccan government. Both stress the need of the return to a trusted 
scholarly authority, to Sufism and to the madhhabs. It is unclear, however, 
to what extent these Dutch mosques are influenced by, or perhaps even 
directed by the Morocco state. Taking the perspective of the Moroccan 
state, we know that Moroccan diaspora communities are an important 
aspect of the Moroccan national religious policies. According to the state 
policy, the official Moroccan Islam serves a symbol of national unity under 
the king and this unity encompasses all Moroccans, including the diaspora 
communities. 25  Because of this viewpoint, the Moroccan government 
developed several policies to both engage and serve the diaspora 
communities in their practice of Islam, such as sending imams to the 
                                                
22 “Antwoord van Sunni Instituut op de Onkunde van Al-Yaqeen m.b.t. de Aankondigingen voor Ramadan 
en Ied,” Sunni Instituut, accessed on June 3, 2017, http://sunni-instituut.nl/sunni-instituut.nl/antwoord-
van-sunni-instituut-op-de-onkunde-van-al-yaqeen-m-b-t-de-aankondigingen-voor-ramadan-en-ied/. 
23 “Ons Verhaal,” Kennishuys, accessed on June 3, 2017, https://kennishuys.com/over-ons/ons-
verhaal/. 
24 “I’la ̄n ‘an Dawwara Shar’iyya ash-Shama ̄’il al-Muh ̣ammadiyya”; 
“Over ons.” 
25 Zeghal, Islamism in Morocco, 252; 
Merel Kahmann, “Ontmoetingen tussen Marokkaanse Nederlanders en de Marokkaanse Overheid: Een 
Anthropologisch Perspectief,” (PhD diss., Universiteit Leiden, 2014), 128. 
25 Kahmann, “Ontmoetingen tussen Marokkaanse Nederlanders en de Marokkaanse Overheid,” 128. 
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Netherlands during Ramadan, organizing lectures, providing copies of the 
Qur’an and founding organizations and information centers.26  
 
Yet, both the implementation and reception of these Moroccan 
religious policies have not been fruitful. Lack of both institutional capacity 
and jurisdiction outside Morocco’s borders restrict the state’s 
implementation abroad.27 Bouras, in her work on transnational ties between 
the Moroccan Dutch community and the Moroccan state, studied the shifts 
in the attitudes of the Moroccan state, the Dutch state and the Moroccan 
Dutch migrants. In her work, she reasons that the relation of the Moroccan 
Dutch community to the Moroccan government can only be studied by 
looking both at the policies of the two states involved and the migrants 
choices. She came to the conclusion that government policies on the 
maintenance of ties with the country of origin are co-responsible for 
migrants’ transnational identity.28 Kahmann, on the other hand, assesses 
the same issue from the perspective of the migrant. According to Kahmann, 
Moroccan state policies have been met with reluctance in the Netherlands.29  
She argues that the Moroccan Dutch resist the official Moroccan Islam due 
to the perception that Islam and national political interests are intertwined 
and therefore problematic. As a result, the Moroccan Dutch aim to follow an 
Islam that is based on Moroccan traditions but is divorced from the 
Moroccan state. 30  Thus, we could only observe that the two mosques 
proclaim a similar religious discourse to that of the state but there is no 
definite evidence of a causal connection. The question is whether that is the 
case, and whether it is done with the same motivation. The latter question 
is provoked by the different contexts: the Moroccan state has to deal with a 
social, cultural, political and religious situation that is quite different from 
that what the Dutch mosques are confronted with.  
 
This thesis will address the following question: What are the 
(dis)similarities in the discourses used by the Moroccan government and 
                                                
26 Ibid, 31, 60-61, 128-129. 
27 Marvine Howe, Morocco: The Islamists Awakening and Other Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 126.  
28 Bouras, “Het Land van Herkomst,” 1-12, 263. 
29 Kahmann, “Ontmoetingen tussen Marokkaanse Nederlanders en de Marokkaanse Overheid,” 1-40. 
30 Ibid, 60-61. 
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these two Morocco-affiliated mosques in advocating madhhab traditionalism 
and why have these (dis)similarities occurred? 
 
Relevance 
 
The topic of this thesis is important for three reasons. First of all, the 
call for the need for madhhab traditionalism is a new development that 
takes place on several levels - individual, institutional and governmental - 
and in several dimensions - global, national and transnational. This thesis 
aims to contribute to this fast developing topic that is new and therefore 
under-researched.  
 
Second, this thesis makes a contribution to the research that has 
been conducted on Morocco’s involvement amongst the Dutch Moroccan 
diaspora community.31 This involvement has always been of great interest 
to the Dutch government. 32  Indeed, an official report mentions that 
Morocco’s intention to influence the religiosity of its diaspora citizens 
clashes with the Dutch national secular framework.33 This thesis deals with 
the same subject, but from the perspective of the Dutch Moroccan diaspora 
community. The Moroccan Dutch nationals living in the Netherlands are 
often portrayed as having no agency when it comes to their religious 
choices, being merely left at the mercy of external forces.34 Thus, this thesis 
aims to highlight the extent of their own agency in religious matters. 
 
The third point of relevance of this thesis is that it will contribute to a 
further understanding of the particularities of Islam in the Netherlands. One 
                                                
31 Kahmann, “Ontmoetingen tussen Marokkaanse Nederlanders en de Marokkaanse Overheid;”  
Nadia Bouras, “Het Land van Herkomst.” 
32  “Dreiginsbeleid Terrorisme Nederland 42,” Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 
July 2016, accessed on May 16, 2016, 
https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/DTN42_samenvatting_opgemaakt_def_tcm31-79507.pdf; 
“Kamerbrief concretisering aanpak salafisme,” Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 
accessed on June 1, 2016, https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/kamerbrief-concretisering-aanpak-
salafisme_tcm31-32841.pdf; 
“Salafisme in Nederland: Diversiteit en Dynamiek,” AIVD, accessed on June 4, 2016, 
https://www.aivd.nl/over-aivd/nieuws/2015/09/23/inhoud-pagina-salafisme-in-nederland-diversiteit-en-
dynamiek; 
Kamerbrief Verslag werkbezoek Marokko, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 28 mei 
2015; 
“Bilaterale Betrekkingen met Marokko,” Rijksoverheid, accessed on December 30, 2015, 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-nederland/inhoud/marokko. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Kahmann, “Ontmoetingen tussen Marokkaanse Nederlanders en de Marokkaanse Overheid,” 17. 
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of the insights that this thesis may provide is the extent to which the 
Muslims in the Netherlands are indeed autonomous in their interpretation 
and practice of Islam. 
 
Methodology 
 
I will analyze the two discourses – Moroccan government and the 
Dutch mosques – based on primary written and spoken sources. The 
method used to approach primary sources is the work of Wetherell, Taylor 
and Yates on discourse analysis. 35  Based on that approach, I define 
discourse as referring to communication practices, usually texts, which 
systematically shape our knowledge of reality.36 Wetherell, Taylor and Yates 
describe how truths are created through what individuals, institutions or 
states communicate, because the discourses themselves pretend to 
communicate the truth. In this thesis, I will examine these created truths 
and the systems of meaning behind them. In the case of the discourses of 
the Moroccan state and the two mosques, I will look at several topics and 
categories as discussed in these discourses. The first is how both discourses 
define the Malakite school of law, the Asharite tradition of theology and 
Sufism. The second is the arguments used for the necessity of following the 
Malakite school of law, the Asharite tradition of theology, and Sufism. The 
third topic is how the relationship between the Moroccan national identity 
and these three Islamic traditions is articulated within the discourses. The 
fourth and last is how the king’s position as political and religious leader is 
being discussed. An important part of this comparative discourse analysis 
will be the focus on context and why the involved actors use the argument 
that they do, since discourses always stand in close connection with the 
context. 37  In the conclusion, I provide a comparison between the two 
discourses analyzed. 
 
With regards to sources, I will analyze the official Moroccan discourse 
on normative Islam on the basis of ten royal speeches and the so-called 
                                                
35 Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates, Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis 
(The Open University, 2001), i-ii. 
36 Ibid, i-ii. 
37 Ibid, i-ii. 
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“Imam Guidebook”. I have chosen these specific speeches, because they 
address the subject of the official Moroccan Islam. The speeches are 
available on YouTube in spoken Modern Standard Arabic and in written form 
on a governmental website. The king has given most of these speeches on 
television, thereby addressing the entire Moroccan nation. In one instance, 
the king addressed a Sufi order and in another, the Minister of Islamic 
Affairs and Endowments read the king’s speech, whilst addressing the 
audience of a Sufi conference. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and 
Endowments has published the imam-guide that instructs imams as well as 
the laymen on official Moroccan Islam. After its release in 2005, the Ministry 
dispersed it to all imams in the Kingdom as part of establishing an official 
Moroccan Islam. The book is cheap and widely available in Tamazight, 
Modern Standard Arabic and French.  
 
The analysis of the discourse of the Dutch mosques is based on 
religious classes and lectures. Some of the mosques’ lectures are available 
on Youtube. At the start of collecting data for this thesis, in August 2015, I 
attended a series of twelve classes on fiqh and ‘aqīda – jurisprudence and 
theology. In an earlier phase of gathering data, the scope of this thesis 
exclusively dealt with Imam Malik. As a result, I have gathered more data 
pertaining to this mosque than to the El Islam. Additionally, I have attended 
lectures at both mosques that concerned relevant themes for the scope of 
this thesis. The religious classes of Imam Malik took place in Dutch, 
whereby instructors used religious terms in Arabic such as h ̣adīth, ih ̣sān and 
dalīl. The names of the lecturers were Mohamed Aarab and Said Mokadmi. 
At El-Islam, the lecturer, Alkhammar Al-Bakkali, did not speak Dutch and 
therefore gave his lectures in the Moroccan Arabic dialect with a short 
summary in Dutch afterwards. For this thesis I have also studied a number 
of Friday sermons. However, I have chosen to exclude the content of these 
sermons, since they turned out to be mostly irrelevant for this thesis.  
 
I will answer the research question in four parts: In the first chapter I 
will discuss the Moroccan context relating to the establishment of the official 
Moroccan Islam and its policies. In the second chapter, an analysis will be 
provided of the official religious discourse. In the third chapter, I will discuss 
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the Dutch context, the two mosques and known discussions on Islamic 
traditionalism in the Netherlands. In the fourth and last chapter I will 
analyze the religious discourses of the two mosques.  
 15 
1. The Adoption of the official Moroccan Islam 
 
As with so many monarchies, the nation and state of Morocco 
legitimizes itself through religion. Politics and religion, state and Islam come 
together in the person of the king.38 The sixth article of the constitution 
states that Islam is the state religion and the nineteenth article represents 
the king as highest representative of the nation and Amīr al-Mu’minīn – 
Commander of the Faithful. This grants him the highest political and 
religious authority in the country. This is further demonstrated by the 
twenty-third article, which states that the king is inviolable and sacred.39 On 
the grounds of the king’s lineage to the prophet, he claims to have acquired 
baraka – often explained as divine blessings, which legitimizes his political 
and religious authority as both political leader (king) and Amīr al-
Mu’minīn.40 As a result many Moroccans believe that through the king’s 
lineage to the prophet, divine blessings are also bestowed upon Morocco.41 
Nevertheless, throughout the country’s history and in contemporary times, 
this religious legitimization of political rule has been contested many times, 
as we will see below. 
 
Sufism 
 
For the subject of this thesis, we need to further explore its relevance 
for Islam in Morocco before we can continue with the contemporary forms 
of Moroccan state policy on Islam. In Moroccan history, Sufism has had a 
significant influence on politics and religion through Sufi saints and Sufi 
brotherhoods, even though it never acquired a definite political category or 
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entity of its own.42 The reason for its popularity and influence is first and 
foremost a result of its spiritual appeal, but also economic and political 
reasons.43  In history, Morocco’s Sufism can be divided into two types: 
tabarruk (seeking baraka from one or more individuals, dead or alive) and 
tarbiyya (mass moral education and moral edification).44 Beside spiritual or 
religious appeal, Sufi brotherhoods - such as the Nās ̣iriyya and Dilā’iyya - 
played a critical role in local trade deals, because they administered land, 
water resources and often-visited Sufi shrines. As a result, membership or 
adherence offered advantageous connections and political power through 
their large numbers of adherents.45 Throughout history, Sufi brotherhoods 
and Sufi saints therefore posed as much a threat as an opportunity for the 
monarchy. The threat showed in its occasional challenge to the religious 
legitimacy of several Moroccan dynasties through time.46 Both Sufi leaders 
and the head of the Alaouite dynasty competed for the claim of having 
acquired the highest amount of baraka.47 An example of such a tension is 
illustrated with the exile in 1668 of the leaders of the Dilā’iyya brotherhood 
and the destruction of their shrine by the Alaouite sultan, because they had 
allegedly challenged the dynasty’s position as true Commander of the 
Faithful.48 During colonial times, - when the tabarruk Qādiriyya and the 
Tijāniyya brotherhoods gained influence – domestic leadership not only 
perceived Sufi leaders as a political threat, but also by French colonialists.49 
On the other hand, domestic rulers have long depended on these same Sufi 
structures to claim allegiances from the population through them, and to 
legitimize jihad against foreign powers.  
 
In post-independence Morocco, king Hassan II (reigned from 1961 to 
1999) attempted to control, divide and gather Sufi leaders around the 
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throne as much as possible.50 During his reign, it is clear that he perceived 
them to be a significant threat to his political power and religious 
legitimacy.51 Accordingly, Hassan II worked towards bringing down Sufi 
institutions, pilgrimage sites and Sufi educational structures.52 Immediately 
upon his ascension to the throne in 1961, he made it a constitutional 
requirement that the king was also the Amīr al-Mu’minīn, hoping that in 
doing so he would acquire religious legitimacy as a descendent of the 
prophet.53 The title was not just a symbolic gesture: Hassan II showed 
great enthusiasm in expressing his opinion on religious matters in 
broadcasts and publications.54 Generally, this illustrates how the monarch 
aimed to have a tight grip on all matters of religion and politics. However, in 
the shifting world of the Cold War period, new forms of Islamic activism – 
besides the existing Sufi institutes – started to challenge his claim as the 
highest political as well as religious authority. 
 
Salafism and Wahhabism 
 
Salafism and Wahhabism in many of its forms have a long and 
diverse history in Morocco ever since it first appeared in the 19th century 
with returning pilgrims from Mecca. 55  Although rather contested during 
these times, King Hassan II welcomed and benefited from these influences 
during his reign. In the context of the Cold War and the Iranian Revolution, 
the Moroccan regime perceived these Islamic trends and activists as a tool 
to counter president Nasr’s communism and Iran’s political Islam. 56 
Furthermore Hassan II perceived Wahhabism and Salafism as benefiting his 
claims to religious legitimacy, as they required strict obedience to the ruler 
in exchange for the guarantee of stability and Sharia.57 During the period 
between the 1970s and late 1980s, the Moroccan state established close 
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diplomatic ties with the Wahhabist Saudi monarchy and received large sums 
to fund its expensive Sahara war in return for the encouragement of the 
Wahhabist creed.58 As a result, Saudi Arabia was allowed to freely promote 
Wahhabism in Morocco during Hassan II’s reign by building mosques, 
Islamic schools, placing Wahhabist preachers in universities and spreading 
cheap books and cassettes. 59  Hassan II, in turn, openly supported 
Wahhabism and critiqued the Islamic traditionalism of the schools of law for 
their blind adherence to religious scholars.60 It was during these years that 
Wahhabism, but also derivative forms of globalized Salafism and Jihadism, 
gained a foothold in Morocco.61 Moroccan preachers with strong Wahabist 
and Salafist views, like Az-Zamzami (d. 1989), Abdelkrim Mouti (d. 2016) 
and Mohamed Fizazi (b. 1949) preached a very literalist, and often violent, 
form of Islam.62  
 
It was only in the 1980s that Hassan II began to perceive some forms 
of Islam, Wahhabism and Salafism as a threat and started to encourage and 
discourage particular representations thereof.63 His main concern was his 
recognition as the religious and political authority as Commander of the 
Faithful: he openly encouraged the various Islamic factions to recognize this 
claim to authority and tightened the grip around those who did not.64 An 
interesting example of this approach is the so-called ‘moderate’ Ḥizb al-
‘udālat wat-tanmiyya or Party of Justice and Development (PJD). In their 
political vision, they stress the importance of recognizing the authority of 
the king, whilst their Islamist framework would suggest they would not. 
They advocate for Islamic issues, but do so within the political framework of 
the state. The regime opted for the proclaimed state obedience of the PJD, 
and tolerated its political presence.65 This illustrates that in this episode of 
Moroccan history, religious experience was not so much categorized in 
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terms of malignant or benign versions of Islam, but drawn along the lines of 
whether one accepted or challenged the king’s authority and his baraka as 
Commander of the Faithful and descendant of the prophet. This was still the 
case in the beginning of Mohammed VI’s reign, who replaced his father 
after his death in 1999.  
 
Moroccan Islam 
 
A large shift in Moroccan religious policies took place after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York and in particular after 
the Casablanca bombing on May 16, 2003. The Moroccan government 
embarked on a new policy in which an official Moroccan Islam was 
characterized and re-constructed.66 Whereas before, the government’s sole 
concern had been the acceptance of the king’s religious authority as 
Commander of the Faithful, now the Moroccan regime actively strives to 
counter influences of ‘foreign’ categories of Islam – mainly Wahhabism, 
Salafism and hybrid forms thereof. Similarly, Shi’ism is actively countered 
within state discourse.67 Thus, from this moment onwards, the traditionalist 
Malikite, Asharite and Sufi Islam was actively advocated by the state as 
being the only correct version of Islam. 68 This form of state Islam was 
called “the official Moroccan Islam”. The justification of this official Moroccan 
Islam was the necessity of assuring the unity and cohesion of the nation 
and avoiding discord. The promotion of this national Islam of Morocco 
entails a clear break with the past in which Saudi Wahhabist and Salafist 
preachers’ influences were welcomed or tolerated.  
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The Moroccan government formulated the official Moroccan Islam in 
such a manner that it represented their political interests. It selectively 
makes use of history and the religious manifestations that can loosely be 
described as Islam in Morocco. This is not a novel development. The term 
“Moroccan Islam” did not exist until its creation in between 1904 and 1912. 
Back then, French colonial authorities coined the term “Moroccan Islam” in 
their ethnographic archive as part of the effort to gather information on 
Morocco as to better control it.69 According to Burke, the term has been 
reinterpreted five times since then, in order to adapt its content and how it 
can be used.70 Burke draws the conclusion that the term has come to 
represent whoever is in power and the political goals he aims to achieve.  
 
Today, the Moroccan government has selected the Malikite school of 
law, the Asharite tradition of theology and a demarcated style of Moroccan 
Sufism.71 This is justified on the basis of the historical fact that in pre-
modern times the ‘ulamā’, in what is today the Kingdom of Morocco, 
determined religious and juridical norms on the basis of the Asharite 
tradition of theology and the Malikite school of law.72 Sufism has been 
present in Morocco since the advent of Islam in the country. It has always 
been formed by hagiolatry, religious brotherhoods and Sharifism – a 
religious and political phenomenon that places ancestral prestige in shurafā’ 
- descendants of the prophet.73  
 
The Moroccan government’s selected style of Sufism takes Sharifism 
into account, mixed with New Age practices,74 but ignores other aspects of 
Morocco’s historical Sufism. It fails to acknowledge the Alaouite monarchy’s 
constant historical and contemporary struggle with Sufi leaders and 
religious scholars. A contemporary example is Jamā’at al-‘Adl wal-Ih ̣sān - a 
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Sufi organization with strong popular backing, whose founder Abdasslame 
Yassine publically criticized the monarchy, the king and the general lack of 
civil rights. Al-‘Adl believes that the title of Amīr al-Mu’minīn is illegitimate 
and advocates for the removal of Morocco’s hereditary monarchy.75 
 
With the introduction of the official Moroccan Islam, Mohammed VI 
has taken firm steps in establishing a fixed national orthodoxy by 
standardizing and institutionalizing official theology and religious 
experience.76 The state has done so by monopolizing and institutionalizing 
‘ulamā’ councils and the national right to issue fatwa’s. Before the reign of 
Mohammed VI, Hassan II had welcomed Salafist and Wahhabist preachers 
and deconstructed old ‘ulamā’ institutes that sustained them. Within a 
timespan of several years, Mohammed VI made large efforts to build up a 
revitalized national council of ‘ulamā’ – Rabit ̣a Muh ̣ammadiyya - that would 
be part of the state. Since then, it is illegal for Islamic scholars to issue 
fatwa’s if they are not members of the national council. The Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs and endowments screens and writes Friday sermons of 
Morocco’s mosques every week. The Ministry also set up a new educational 
program that includes Sufi values.77 Overall, the policy is a comprehensive 
and extensive strategy intended to systemize, monitor and ensure 
uniformity in religious practice, experience and educational activities 
throughout the country. 
 
Spreading the official Moroccan Islam through education however, 
went far beyond Friday sermons and setting up a ‘ulamā’ council. In 2014, 
the king opened an institute for educating imams and female preachers in 
the Malikite, Asharite and Sufi tradition. The imam institute, Institut 
Mohammed VI de formation des imams, morchidines et morchidates, aims 
to educate religious leaders from Tunisia, Libya, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal and Gabon. The institute also aspires to increase the role 
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of murshidāt, or female religious leaders in society. Adding murshidāt as 
representatives of state Islam sends the message that this reformed Islam 
includes the values of gender equality.78 
 
The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments has been given 
increased resources to emphasize the presence of the official Moroccan 
Islam.79 The Ministry has published books on Islam and started a broadcast 
– As-Sādisa (‘the sixth’), playfully hinting at Mohammed VI’s name – 
strongly promoting Sufism as important part of the official Moroccan 
Islam.80 Another of the Ministry’s projects has been to create the Imam 
Handbook. The imam and murshidāt graduates are obliged to sign a 
contract that states their commitment to respect the vision in the 
handbook.81 Apart from that, the handbook is meant to instruct all religious 
leaders in the country. The Ministry has distributed fifty thousand copies of 
the handbook on top of extensive training. The aim of this project is to 
equip religious leaders with a document that helps them to preserve the 
correct religious unity: it discusses Asharite dogma, Malikite law, Sufism, 
Sufi ethics and the king’s Commandership of the Faithful, but all in 
accordance to a single interpretation. It also provides the tools to spread 
this message to mosque attendees and believers.82  
 
The Moroccan government has reserved an important position for 
Sufism in its new efforts to institutionalize Islamic orthodoxy. The Moroccan 
government has given Sufism and Sufi institutes an impulse as part of these 
policies. Old centres around graves of saints have been given large sums in 
order to attract visitors. 83 The king and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and 
endowments have both provided financial and public endorsements to a 
large and well-known tarbiyya Sufi brotherhood that forms part of the 
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Qādiriyya – the Būdshīshī – to the extent that scholars have started to call 
it “Morocco’s national brotherhood”.84 Scholars have argued that the state 
selected this particular brotherhood over others, because they are known 
for their large numbers and alleged apolitical character. 85 This suggests 
that the Sufism of the Būdshīshī does not promote activism. In fact, its 
leadership actively asks its followers and visitors to refrain from politics and 
to support the Moroccan king.86  
 
The increasing importance of Sufism is also illustrated by the 
appointment of Ahmed Taoufiq as Minister of Islamic Affairs and 
Endowments, who is openly affiliated to the Būdshīshī brotherhood.87 The 
king’s direct appointment of the minister was symbolic of a new, reforming 
line in governmental policies in the sphere of Islam.88 The Minister has, 
since his appointment, been very active in urging national religious scholars 
and preachers to invoke Sufi saints and celebrate their baraka in sermons 
and lectures.89 Additionally, the saintly family of the Būdshīshī order has 
been asked to organize the world famous Fes Sacred Music Festival. The 
festivities also form part of the government’s effort to promote Sufism in a 
contemporary fashion.90 The festival brings together a variety of themes 
such as Sufism, human rights, new age beliefs, intercultural dialogue, 
religious tolerance and human development.91  
 
Overall, the government under Mohammed VI has openly chosen an 
approach in which the domain of Islam is completely controlled and in which 
particular types of Islam are promoted. The government has carefully 
                                                
84 Avi Max Spiegel, Young Islam: The New Politics of Religion in Morocco and the Arab World (New Jersey 
& Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2015), 135-136. 
85 Bouasria, Sufism and Politics in Morocco, 1; 
Werenfels, “Beyond Authoritarian Upgrading,” 275. 
Maghraoui, “The Strengths and Limits of Religious Reforms in Morocco,” 195; 
Kalpakian, “Current Moroccan Anti-Terrorism Policy,” 1;  
Alonso & Garcia Rey, “The Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Morocco,” 583-584; 
Pruzan-Jørgonson, “The Islamist Movement in Morocco,” 19. 
El-Katiri, “The Institutionalization of Religious Affairs,” 61; 
Spiegel, Young Islam, 135-137. 
86 Bouasria, Sufism and Politics in Morocco, 2. 
87 Zeghal, Islamism in Morocco, 249. 
88 Pruzan-Jørgonson, “The Islamist Movement in Morocco,” 19. 
89 Muedini, Sponsoring Sufism, 78. 
90 Ibid, 48. 
91 Maghraoui, “The Strengths and Limits of Religious Reforms in Morocco,” 195. 
 24 
constructed this particular type and made it highly visible through media, 
mosques, religious institutions and festivals.   
 
 
  
 25 
2. Discourse analysis of the official Moroccan Islam 
 
In this chapter, I will analyze ten of the king’s speeches on Islam as 
well as the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowment’s Imam Guidebook. I 
will discuss four topics discussed in these speeches and the guide: how 
Islam is defined; arguments for following the Malakite, Asharite and Sufi 
traditions; the relation between the Moroccan identity and Islam and the 
Commandership of the Faithful in relation to Islam. 
 
Category 1: Definition of Islam 
 
In his speeches, the king continuously defines Islam as a religion of 
peace and tolerance. He stresses how Moroccan Islam is kind hearted, 
open-minded, modern and facilitates political stability for Moroccans. 
Furthermore, he denounces radical or extremist forms of Islam as 
influences from abroad or simply not Islamic: “Those who engage in 
terrorism, in the name of Islam, are not Muslims.”92  Through his speeches 
the King re-defines Islamic terms to fit his own interpretation of Islam, 
whilst moving it away from interpretations he aims to counter. In this way, 
the official Moroccan Islam serves as a counter narrative to other 
interpretations within Islam:  
 
This urgent demand can only be achieved through the collective 
mobilization of all advocates of moderate Islam and its Sunni approach, 
in order to block the path of extremism, terrorism, fragmentation, 
division and deviant doctrines.93  
 
He endorses Sunni Islam and Sufism, both essential aspects of official 
Moroccan Islam, as the means through which to counter the influence of 
doctrines that are not considered Sunni Islam or madhhab traditionalism. 
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Terms like ‘jihād’, ‘ijtihād’ and ‘sharia’ are given an explicitly different 
content than in interpretations of Islam that the Moroccan government 
considers extremist. In three instances,94 the King mentions how only he 
has the right to perform ijtihād as the Commander of Faithful and how it 
should be used to create “a harmonious blend between traditional values 
and modern creativity.”95 Jihād, according to the king, is only valid when 
called for by the Commander of the Faithful and will not be rewarded by a 
number of virgins. 96  In another instance, he mentions jihād as a Sufi 
exercise in order to purify the inner self.97 The same applies to the use of 
the term ‘sharia’. In the three instances that he has named the term,98 he 
has only used it in combination with “t ̣āriqa” – which is a Sufi term for ‘path’ 
or a broader term for ‘Sufi brotherhood’. This implies that the king bundles 
sharia with t ̣āriqa.  The phrase “Sharia and t ̣āriqa are in perfect balance” 
also demonstrates this: without the Sufi path or brotherhood, sharia is not 
complete. In this manner, the King has reclaimed these terms and used 
them it to legitimize his version of Islam, since these words are inextricably 
linked to Islam as a whole. The new use of these terms demonstrates that 
he aims to counter religious extremism whilst also producing a counter 
narrative, by attributing a new meaning. 
 
The Imam Guidebook defines Islam mainly as a cultural force that is 
specific for the Moroccan nation and culture. The book does not justify the 
choice for the Malikite school of law, Asharite tradition of theology and 
Sufism. Apparently, that is a given. Instead, it addresses how historically 
the Asharite Malikite rite has formed a lasting resistance against doctrinal 
deviations and how it has always managed to facilitate unity amongst 
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nations in times of religious polemics. 99  In addition to this, the Imam 
Guidebook considers official Moroccan Islam to entail something different 
than a juridical methodology: “It constitutes civilizational and social 
heritage, a religious identity, a unifying force.”100 It has become a “mode of 
living, a way of thinking, an architectural theme and a social identity” that is 
specific for Moroccans.101 It assumes a modality in which all Moroccans are 
culturally homogenous, Muslim and follow the official Moroccan Islam as 
promoted by the government. The guide goes on to mention how the 
psychological influences of the Malikite Asharite traditions on the Moroccan 
culture and mind are profound. As a result of this, the population is 
harmonized with its surroundings and has the tendency to retain the 
stability of a society like a second nature.102 This illustrates that the Imam 
Guidebook defines the Malikite and Asharite traditions as an instrument 
embodies and transmits Moroccan culture and it social identity. Even though 
the Malikite school of law and the Asharite tradition of theology are religious 
beliefs, the Imam Guidebook does not define their religious principles. 
Instead, it equates them with identity and civilizational heritage.   
 
Category 2: Malikite, Asharite and Sufi schools 
 
Whereas the Imam Guidebook does not justify the choice for the 
Malikite, Asharite and Sufi schools, the King does. In several of his 
speeches, he politicizes Sufism by framing it as the antithesis to extremism 
and political Islam: 
 
[Religious doubt] was propagated by the dark image spread by the 
extremists. This confirms the necessity of reviving Sufi schools and 
doctrines in order to heal and harness souls and to restore the balance 
between matter and spirit, in the light of Islam’s tolerant moderation.103 
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Rhetorically, the king constantly repeats this opposition: “promoting 
Moroccan Islam and combatting blind extremism,” 104  “Sufi’s bear the 
responsibility of facing the challenge of fanaticism,”105 and “they [Salafists] 
could not be further away from the true Islam [of the Malikite school of law, 
Asharite tradition of theology and Sufism].”106 Sufism is constructed as the 
embodiment of tolerance, stability and moderation. The Sufi is put forward 
as the society’s example, while other interpretations embody fanaticism, 
extremism and bigotry. The implication is that terrorist attacks took place 
because of a lack of the Malikite school of law, Asharite tradition of theology 
and Sufism and that they should be followed because it is the opposite of 
extremism. 
 
Another argument that the king uses to stress the truthfulness of 
official Moroccan Islam is that it is consistent with Islam. Without further 
explaining it, the king calls it the flawless approach of the sunna107 and the 
only true image of Islam.108 By stating so, the king combats any other 
interpretation and claims the monopoly on the truth without leaving any 
space for other interpretations within Islam. 
 
The king further reasons that Sufism should be followed because it is 
apolitical. Politics is an earthly pursuit, according to the king, which means 
that true Muslims stay away from it: 
 
It should be noted here that all Sufi shrines have to remain true to the 
concept of purity upon which they are founded. And remove them from 
earthly pursuits. Sufi disciples should stay away from acts and attitudes, 
give up any quest for worldly rewards and seek higher goals, instead.109 
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Numerous times during other speeches the king has made clear how Sufism 
“is indeed one of the characteristic spiritual and ethical components of the 
Moroccan identity.”110 Additionally, the king often stresses how a Moroccan 
is a good citizen if he or she observes the obligation towards the 
Commandership and the preservation of cultural specificities of Morocco.111 
In three simplified steps this means that (1) Sufism should be or is 
apolitical, (2) Sufism is part of Moroccan identity and culture and (3) a 
Moroccan citizen should preserve the Moroccan identity and culture. This 
simplification demonstrates that the King essentially calls for citizens to be 
apolitical and to accept the Commandership of the Faithful as the religious 
and political authority. The official Moroccan Islam, as presented by the 
studied discourses, is in the service of this mission and represents the 
interests of the Moroccan monarchy.  
 
 Although the King extensively addresses why a Moroccan should 
accept Sufism, he is less elaborate on why one should follow the Malikite 
school of law and Asharite tradition of theology. This is also probably the 
case, because he perceives the three components as an indivisible bundle. 
Generally he uses two arguments: First of all, he mentions that the Malikite 
school of law and Asharite tradition of theology legitimize the belief in 
Sufism. Second of all, he stresses that they are both part of Moroccan 
heritage and culture, for instance when he says that Moroccans “have to 
abide by Moroccan laws and respect sacred national and religious values, 
mainly the Malikite and Asharite rite.”112 This implies that, according to the 
king, a Moroccan should follow the Malikite school of law and Asharite 
tradition of theology because an individual is simply Moroccan. 
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Category 3: Relation between Islam and national identity 
 
Both the Imam Guidebook and in the king’s speeches emphasize the 
idea that Morocco has a unique status when it comes to culture and 
religion. 113  They indicate that Moroccans have one unique aspect in 
common: Being Moroccan and Muslim.  
 
Ours is a typically Moroccan approach in the practice of Islam[.]114  
 
This is presented as an established fact: Moroccans’ “unwavering 
commitment to the nation’s unchangeable values” serves as the essence of 
the nation.115 This is an idea of exclusivity, as Morocco’s approach to Islam 
is being imagined as unique, and therefore different from other nations. It 
follows that Islam is divided along national lines, according to the king and 
ministry.  
 
In King Mohammed VI’s rhetoric, Islam is constantly put forward as a 
unifying force of the Moroccan nation. During every speech on Islam, but 
also in the Imam Guidebook, emphasis is placed on the fact that it is the 
first and foremost aim of the government’s policy to achieve unity:  “This 
exalted meeting [with Sufi’s] is held as part of the wise policy that we are 
aiming for with the firm conviction and clear vision to achieve unity.” 116 
According to the king, Islam’s role is to bring hearts together and to unite 
the umma of Morocco.117  The concept of unity of the Moroccan nation 
through Moroccan Islam is the overarching theme in his discourse on 
Moroccan Islam and in the Imam Guidebook. The concept of unity is built on 
three pillars that facilitate this unity: the God-given Commandership of the 
Faithful, Sufi Islam as the politicized ‘good’ Islam and Moroccan Islam as a 
cultural force.118 
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During his speeches, the king emphasizes that Morocco’s identity is 
based on it divine chosen position. This is based on Morocco’s link with 
Sufism and the Commandership of the Faithful. First of all, he has stated 
that Sufi saints historically chose Morocco as their spiritual seat because 
they were aware of Morocco’s commitment to Islam and the prophetic 
traditions. Sufi beliefs support that awliya’ Allah – or saintly pious 
individuals – are closer to God than other less pious believers and may 
receive ilham – or divine inspiration. It also takes for granted that Sufis 
chose Morocco, because Morocco facilitated the idea of a true Islam, which 
is, in fact, Sufi Islam. Another dimension of the argument is that the 
monarchy has been committed to the Commandership of the Faithful. The 
king characterizes the Commandership as a pillar of Sunni Islam and the 
source of security, unity and cohesion for the Moroccan people. This last 
aspect demonstrates the dual function of the Commander of the Faithful: 
He is both responsible for politically leading a unified nation, while 
embodying one of the pillars of Sunni Islam. 
 
In the speeches on Moroccan official Islam, the King essentially 
discusses an identity in which Islam and Morocco completely merge: “Is 
there any reason why we should give up our traditions and forsake our 
cultural values - which are rooted in tolerance and moderation - in order to 
embrace a different doctrine that has nothing to do with our ethics or the 
way we were brought up?” This means that the defining point of official 
Moroccan Islam is its cultural “Moroccanness”. In comparison, the discourse 
is rarely about belief in God, ritual building blocks like salat and hajj, or 
other transcendental issues. Instead, secular issues and concepts have been 
prominent such as security, political stability, social cohesion, Moroccan 
cultural identity, balancing religious tradition with modernity, tolerance and 
the fight against extremism. By doing so, it endorses religion, but mainly as 
a cultural shell and heritage. It fails to address religious issues in their 
content, whilst the term is deployed polemically against ‘foreign’ influences 
that would threaten the culture. This is further illustrated when the 
Moroccan king discusses Middle Eastern influences on Morocco and 
refugees: “These refugees have to follow Moroccan law and respect sacred 
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national and religious values.” 119  This demonstrates that the discourse 
radiates a strategy that endorses a certain interpretation of Islam, but 
nearly only as a cultural force to counter Islamic extremism and political 
Islam, whilst inextricably linking Islam to Moroccan identity. 
 
Category 4: Commandership of the Faithful 
 
The Commandership of the Faithful is one of the main recurring 
themes in the speeches of the king when discussing Moroccan Islam. It is 
also one of the four directives of Moroccan Islam as laid out by the Imam 
Guidebook, as said earlier. Both in the speeches and in the guide, the 
Commandership is explained as a concept that serves Moroccan believers or 
citizens: 
 
In the presence of the Commandership of Believers, the Moroccan 
citizen feels spiritual security because of his guarantee of the right of 
exercising and expressing his religion. These Moroccan mosques, with 
their traditional and authentic architecture, performs the call to prayer 
five times a day for security, safety and peace for people, for all people. 
And thus, because the mosques proclaim that their faith is placed under 
the protection of the Commander of the Faithful, peace and serenity is 
felt in their hearts.120 
 
In line with this, the King often calls himself the first servant of the nation, 
who is burdened with the task of overseeing the religious domain, leading 
the nation and preserving its unity.121 The obligations of the ‘other servants’ 
of the nation include observing the duties towards the Commandership of 
the Faithful as the legitimate authority.122 The vocabulary of a hierarchy of 
servants is consistent with terms within Sufi orders, in which all members 
strive to achieve a common spiritual goal. It affirms a worldview in which all 
are members of the same body, with some members having a higher 
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position of religious authority or more baraka than others within the 
body.123 The king is essentially applying the character of obedience of the 
Sufi master-disciple relation to a national structure of a monarch and his 
subjects. It follows that accepting the religious and political authority of the 
monarch as the master and first servant is one of the fundamental rules of 
being admitted to the ‘Sufi’ body of the Moroccan nation. Secondly, the king 
often refers back to his lineage as a descendant of the prophet.124 Similarly, 
this concept of hereditary baraka through prophetic descent is present in 
most forms of Sufism in Morocco.125 By promoting and calling upon Sufism’s 
symbols and rituals, the king legitimizes Sufi’s belief system of baraka while 
reinforcing his own legitimacy as king and Commander of the Faithful. 
 
 Apart from the reproduced master-disciple relation, Sufism also plays 
a more direct role in symbiosis with the Commandership of the Faithful. In 
several speeches, the king directly assured Sufis of his loyalty and 
solicitude.126  This loyalty is a two-way street: On top of promising his 
support, he requested Sufi’s to pray for the monarch during Sufi rituals and 
meetings. 127  The discourse suggests symbiosis, in which the monarch 
supports Sufism morally and financially, while asking for legitimization of his 
authority from Sufi orders. The king further dwells on this relationship 
between the monarchy and Sufism in terms of history: 
 
Under the leadership of my faithful ancestors, Morocco has been faithful 
to a long tradition of protecting Sufism and Sufi’s, honoring their 
dignitaries and their shrines. As long as they abided by the sunnah of 
Mohammad and remained committed to the unity of the nation and the 
community, under the Commandership of the Faithful, which is the 
                                                
123 Abdellah Hammoudi, “The Reinvention of Dar al-mulk: The Moroccan Political System and its 
Legitimation,” in the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power and Politics in Morocco, ed. Rahma Bourquia 
and Susan Gilson Miller (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) 129-175. 
124 “An-nus ̣s ̣ al-kāmil lil-khitāb as-sāmī aladhī wajhuhi jalālat al-mālik ilā l-umma bimunāsibat adh-dhikrā 
63 lithawrat al-mālik wash-sha’b.”  
125 Dale Eickelman, Moroccan Islam (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), 7; 
Geertz, Islam Observed, 26; 
Maarouf, Jinn Eviction as a Discourse of Power, 24-25; 
Eickelman, The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach, 267-270. 
126 “Amīr al-Mu’minīn yūjahi risāla ilā l-mushārikīn fī l-ijtimā’ th-thālith li’atbā’ at-tarīqa t-tijāniyya 
bimadīnati Fa ̄s.”  
127 Ibid.  
 34 
guardian of the doctrinal unity of the nation and of its territorial 
integrity.128 
 
The construction of this symbiotic relation between the Commander of the 
Faithful and Sufi’s fits into the idea that both are inextricably tied to the 
essence of Moroccan Islam, since both facilitate the nation’s unity. The 
commandership is a pillar of moderate Sunni Islam and is a mission 
entrusted by God, according to the king.129 In turn, Sufi’s have historically 
chosen Morocco according to the discourse, because of the monarchy’s 
dedication to the Commandership of the Faithful.130 Both actors, Sufi’s and 
the monarch, profit from this alliance, since it affirms symbols and 
legitimization of religious and politico-religious authority.  
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3. Netherlands, Islam and the Moroccan Dutch 
community 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss the context in which the discourse in El 
Islam and Imam Malik takes place. To be able to do this, the position of the 
three main actors involved are of significance: The ‘presence’ of the 
Moroccan state in Dutch religious spheres, the perspective of the Moroccan 
Dutch community and the connection of the two mosques to Dutch and 
Moroccan society. 
 
Morocco in the Netherlands 
The Moroccan government has long been concerned with the 
Moroccan Dutch community and how to bind them to their country.131 
Religion has always been significant in this, since the first meeting of the 
Amicales – accused of being Rabat’s intimidatory long arm – took place in 
the first Moroccan mosque in the Netherlands in 1974.132 With a number of 
386.000 individuals with a dual Moroccan Dutch nationality, they represent 
roughly 10% of the diaspora community outside Morocco.133 According to 
the Moroccan 41st article of the 2011 constitution, the sitting monarch holds 
responsibility for giving religious guidance to all Moroccans, including 
Moroccan subjects abroad.134 Through his constitutional position as Amīr al 
Mu’minīn, he also claims authority over Moroccans residing outside the 
national boundaries.135 The Moroccans in the diaspora themselves have little 
say in this, because according to Moroccan law they are not able to dispose 
of their nationality regardless if they have acquired a foreign nationality, 
and regardless how long and how many generations they have lived 
abroad.136 Consequently, this means that holders of the nationality, from 
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the perspective of Moroccan law, are unable to deny the king’s religious 
authority over all Moroccans.   
  Morocco has two main reasons why it aims to maintain ties with 
Moroccans abroad. The first reason is that good relations with Morocco 
mean that Moroccans abroad are more inclined to transfer money to family 
members or relations, because they identify with the country. Good 
relations mean an increased likelihood that Moroccans abroad would 
financially invest in businesses and houses in the country.137 The second 
reason entails political stability and security. The country aims to safeguard 
its political stability, by having a larger grip on Moroccans abroad through 
stronger relations. Through increased identification with Morocco and the 
state, Moroccans abroad are supposed to be less inclined to counter the 
monarch’s authority or to radicalize. The promotion of the official Moroccan 
Islam in particular, plays an important role in this.138 
 
The government has several institutes at his disposal involved in the 
implementation of religious policies aimed at Moroccans abroad. Foundation 
Hassan II is responsible for sending imams to European mosques each 
Ramadan and gives out study materials on the Quran and Arabic.139 The 
Moroccan Ministry of Moroccans Abroad establishes Moroccan cultural 
centers in European cities with the aim to preserve Moroccan culture and 
Islamic identity. During the Ramadan of 2012, it had also organized meals 
to break the fasting after sunset.140 The Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Corporation has organized gatherings for imams. The Moroccan Ministry 
of Islamic Affairs and Endowments is also partly responsible for sending the 
imams and founded the Council of Religious Scholars for Europe in 2008.141 
 
Many of Morocco’s religious policies aimed at the Moroccan Dutch or 
Moroccans abroad are rarely successful in their efforts. This is mainly due to 
the political and public sensitivity of the long arm of Rabat in the 
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Netherlands. The involvement of the Moroccan state with Moroccan Dutch 
nationals stirs lively debates in Dutch media and politics about territory, 
foreign influence, but also the loyalty of the citizens involved.142 Another 
reason is Morocco’s lack of capacity to successfully implement religious 
policies. According to Kahmann’s respondents in her research about 
transnational ties, occasional relations between - for instance - Moroccan 
Dutch mosque board members and Moroccan diplomats are often personal 
and lack a tangible organizational structure.143 The lack of visibility of the 
Council of Religious Scholars for Europe in the Moroccan Dutch religious 
landscape underlines the same conclusion.144 Nevertheless, many Moroccan 
Dutch are aware of the Moroccan efforts, such as the delegation imams 
during Ramadan.145  It seems that beside Dutch political sensitivity and a 
Moroccan lack of capacity, the Moroccan Dutch community shows little 
interests in official Moroccan Islam’s association with state politics. 
 
The Moroccan Dutch community 
 
Moroccan Dutch nationals perceive themselves as Muslim first and 
Moroccan or Dutch second.146 In literature, scholars have called this the 
Islamization of identity. This means that many Moroccan Muslims are of the 
opinion that their sense of belonging to a wider Muslim community is more 
important than ethnic or national identities.147 This development coincides 
with a major transition the wider Muslim community has gone through 
during the last decades.148  In the seventies, during the time of family 
reunification, the institutionalization of religion was set in motion: It was 
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the era in which families had decided to settle in their new country.149 The 
transition of Islam had set in with the coming of the second generation of 
Muslims during the nineties. As a result, Islam had shifted from being a 
religion of immigrants to being a religion of a religious minority.150 This is 
particularly true for second generation Muslims in the Netherlands, who 
identify increasingly with Islam, distinct from national boundaries. 151 
Moroccan Dutch second generation migrants find it important that their 
mosque and imam engages with topics that deal with topics relevant in the 
country where they have been born and raised.152 In comparison with their 
parents, their Islamic orientation is aimed at the Dutch society and entails a 
universalistic approach to religious identity, instead of an ethnic-
nationalistic one. Through this process, Islam has largely disengaged from 
the country of origin. 153  Apart from this universalistic Islamic identity, 
Moroccan Dutch nationals nevertheless also present themselves on the level 
of other sorts of identities.  
 
 The Moroccan Dutch community has the tendency to refer to 
themselves as a Berber, instead of a Moroccan. Estimations go as high as 
ninety percent, to claim that a large part of the Moroccan Dutch community 
is of Northern Imazigh or Berber descent. This group is known to have 
antiroyalist sentiments, because of ethnic marginalization and wars. 154 
Historically Morocco is home to a wide range of different ethnic 
backgrounds. Yet, the Moroccan state has mostly highlighted the Arab and 
Muslim elements of its national identity in terms of policies. In the Dutch 
context, most Moroccans identify as Berber and find it important to do so.155 
Consequently, they mostly distance themselves from governmental 
initiatives aimed at the preservation of the Moroccan identity.156 
 
Members of the Moroccan Dutch community do not always feel as if 
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they form part of a constructed Dutch society.157 Migration from Morocco to 
the country in Western Europe has been taking place in large numbers since 
the 1960’s. Yet, their loyalty to the country they live in is often questioned 
in media and politics by means of examining the integration and 
consequences of having a double nationality.158 Part of the issue is the 
public and political sensitivity concerning the existence of a relation of 
influence between Moroccan Dutch and the Moroccan government. 159 
Another part of the issue is that the Moroccan Dutch are the second largest 
Muslim presence in the Netherlands and Islam as a whole is a hotly debated 
issue since the attacks on 9/11.160 Coinciding with this tendency, Moroccan 
Dutch Muslims have the idea that a war is being waged against Islam and 
Muslims.161 This ensures that the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims is 
increasing and has an effect on the religious experience of Moroccan Dutch 
nationals. On the one hand, Moroccan Dutch nationals would like to be a 
part of Dutch society as a Muslim, but on the other they are forced to turn 
to the Islam from Morocco as a result of the lack of Islamic traditions.162 
 
Even though Moroccan Dutch nationals identify as Muslim first and 
maybe as Berber second, they do look to traditions in Morocco for religious 
guidance.163  They are aware of that official Moroccan Islam is strongly 
associated with national political interests and are suspicious of the 
authorities’ intentions. Instead they turn towards Islam from Morocco.164 As 
they refuse the direct intervention of the Moroccan government, they do 
look at Morocco in terms of what school of law they follow, how scholars are 
trained and what religious traditions occur. Some Moroccan Dutch 
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individuals adopt Wahhabist or Salafist Islam. Most Moroccan Dutch 
nationals, however, follow the Malikite school of law.165 This is because it 
gives a sense of recognition and security. They deem it better than ‘foreign’, 
‘radical’ or ‘Salafist’ influences.166 This demonstrates that the preference for 
Islam from Morocco is determined by the image of foreign forms of Islam. 
In practice this means that they adhere to the Malikite school of law, 
Asharite tradition of theology and Sufism and place authority in religious 
scholars instead of the king. 
 
Nevertheless, more push and pull factors are involved when it comes 
to the Moroccan Dutch community and the adherence to the official 
Moroccan Islam. In her dissertation, Kahmann reports a story of how 
Moroccan authorities tried to push Moroccan Dutch Muslims to adopt 
Moroccan fasting times. In this case the attempt was unsuccessful, because 
the Moroccan Dutch involved considered the unity of the wider Muslim 
community more important than to follow the Moroccan state.167 In the 
same manner, the Moroccan state is not in the position to push Moroccan 
Dutch individuals to recognize the religious authority of the king as 
Commander of the Faithful or to always make use of standardized state 
sermons. Consequently, they are not compelled to do so. 168 
 
On other matters, the Moroccan Dutch are in need of the institutional 
framework that the official Moroccan Islam offers. The Moroccan Dutch 
religious community often lacks in religious traditions or knowledge and 
Moroccan Dutch mosque boards often have a hard time to find suitable 
imams. Although they prefer to find imams independently, sometimes the 
help of the Moroccan authorities is needed. Additionally, the Moroccan state 
is the only one who can facilitate repatriation for burials on religious 
grounds. 169  Also, Moroccan Dutch couples depend on Moroccan religious 
family law and the consulate to be able to marry.170 The Moroccan Dutch 
community might not always want to get involved in state policies on Islam, 
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but in some cases they have to when it serves their interests. 
 
Mosques 
 
 Both studied mosques – El Islam and Imam Malik – are loosely and 
vaguely associated with the Moroccan state through their affiliation with 
UMMON. In general, Moroccan mosques in the Netherlands operate 
independently from one another. 171  However, a group of Moroccan 
organizations founded UMMON – Union of Moroccan Muslim Organizations 
Netherlands in 1977 for the purpose of creating unity on the timing of the 
Ramadan.172  UMMON’s imams are generally recruited through family or 
regional connections, from itinerant imams or – when necessary - are sent 
by the Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments.173 Several 
Moroccan Dutch figures have accused UMMON of being a dependency of the 
Moroccan king. 174  The organization itself states that it has never 
represented the Moroccan state. However, there has always been a large 
amount of contact between the Moroccan embassy to the Netherlands and 
UMMON.175 One way or another, affiliation to UMMON reveals little about El-
Islam and Imam Malik’s relationship with Morocco, because the organization 
is called loose to the extent that the organizations itself do not know how 
many mosques adhere to it.176  
 
 Both mosques are rooted in Dutch society through organizations, 
initiatives but also their architecture. The first example of this is that Imam 
Malik is part of the umbrella organization named Raad van Marokkaanse 
Moskeeen Nederland. RMMN had been active in promoting the idea that 
Moroccan Dutch mosque attendees should vote in the elections of March 
2017. It had also created an online voting assistant in order to learn which 
political party represents the interests of Moroccan Muslims the most. When 
Minister Asscher of Social Affairs visited the Imam Malik in 2016, the RMMN 
                                                
171 Sunier, van der Linden and van de Bovenkamp, “The long arm of the state?” 401. 
172 Eric Roose, The Architectural Representation of Islam: Muslim-Commissioned Mosque Design in the 
Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 184. 
173 Ibid, 185. 
174 Mohammed Rabbae, Naast de Amicales nu de UMMON: De Mantelorganisaties van de Marokkaanse 
autoriteiten in Nederland (Utrecht: Nederlands Centrum Buitenlanders, 1993). 
175 Eric Roose, The Architectural Representation of Islam, 185. 
176 Sunier, van der Linden and van de Bovenkamp, “The long arm of the state?” 401. 
 42 
was also present to speak about the disadvantaged position of the Moroccan 
Dutch community. RMMN and Imam Malik’s adherence to this umbrella 
organization demonstrate their involvement in Dutch social and political life. 
 
 Beside from Imam Malik’s membership of the RMMN, both mosques 
have an active social role in the broader society. El Islam structurally 
cooperates with the municipality of The Hague and social organizations.177 
Throughout the year, Imam Malik organizes free tutoring classes for young 
high school students from any background. Additionally, in the past, the 
mosque’s extensive facilities were used for neighborhood meetings.178 In 
2015, the mosque hosted a conference for the municipality of Leiden on 
issues of radicalization. 
 
 The architecture of both mosques also illustrates their symbolic 
relation with their surroundings. El Islam’s style demonstrates a mixture of 
Morocco and the Netherlands: Built in 1997, it is a mix of Moroccan-
associated forms and local materials, which fit the materials used in the 
surrounding buildings.179  Like El-Islam, the mosque has both Dutch and 
Moroccan elements in its architecture. For the commissioners of Imam Malik 
it was important that the building would radiate a Moroccan atmosphere, 
while blending in with the surrounding buildings. In and around the 
mosque, all kinds of symbols that refer to Islam’s earlier presence in Europe 
are incorporated – like the Andalusian eight-pointed star. The architecture 
of both mosques demonstrate that they aim to be a part of Dutch society 
and European Islam, while maintaining Moroccan traditions. 
 
 Both mosques identify as being Morocco-oriented because of the 
large proportion of Moroccan Dutch attendees.180 Also both mosques follow 
the Malikite school of law, Asharite tradition of theology and incorporate 
Sufism. The chair of the El Islam, Ali Belhaj, is one of the stricter adherents 
to Islam from Morocco: “As Moroccans we did not use to have a second or 
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third school. There was only Maliki school: That was Morocco.” 181 
Additionally the lecturer and former imam, Alkhammar Al-Baqqali, is 
predominantly educated in the Moroccan Qarawiyyīn tradition of Malikite 
school of law, the Asharite tradition of theology and Sufism.182  In the case 
of Imam Malik, the choice of the name of the mosque is also a part of 
proclaiming their stance: the board thinks that being Moroccan goes hand in 
hand with following the madhhab traditionalism of Anas ibn Mālik or Imam 
Mālik, one of the founders of the four madhhabs.  
 
 All imams and lecturers of both mosques predominantly received 
their education in traditional religious institutes in Morocco. The Moroccan 
Khammar El-Baqqali had been an imam in El-Islam since its founding in 
1997 and is one of the central figures in the mosque.183 Since a few years, 
he has largely retired from being an imam, but still comes regularly to give 
lectures. He has been a prominent campaigner for a counter narrative 
against the influence of Salafism among the Moroccan Dutch community. He 
sees it as an absolute necessity to react to the emergence of the Salafist 
movement in the Netherlands. 184  Lecturers of the Imam Malik, Said 
Mokadmi and Mohamed Aarab have a role just as prominent in debates 
within the Muslim community on Salafism. Mohammed Aarab is an 
important stakeholder of the institute founded to promote madhhab 
traditionalism in the Netherlands, Sunni Instituut. 185  Like Al-Bakkali, 
Mokadmi was also taught at Qarawiyyīn in Fes. Although all associated 
lecturers and imam advocate a strong madhhab traditionalism and/or Sufi 
doctrine during their lectures, the imams Abdelhamid Belkasmi of Imam 
Malik and Mhamed Rahmani of El-Islam never pray for the Moroccan king 
specifically, as is the case in state monitored sermons.  
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4. Discourse Analysis on Imam Malik & El-Islam 
 
 
In this chapter, I will analyze lectures and religious classes from both 
El-Islam in The Hague and from Imam Malik in Leiden. Both El-Islam and 
Imam Malik preach the Malikite school of law, the Asharite tradition of 
theology and Sufism during classes and lectures on subjects like ‘aqīda, 
fiqh, Sufism and Islam. I will discuss four categories based on these 
lectures and religious classes by Alkhammar Al-Bakkali from El-Islam, Said 
Mokadmi and Mohamed Aarab from Imam Malik: how Islam is defined; 
arguments for following the Malakite, Asharite and Sufi traditions; the 
relation between the Moroccan identity and Islam and the Commandership 
of the Faithful in relation to Islam.  
 
Category 1: Definition of Islam 
 
Lecturers of both mosques defined Islam and following the Malikite 
school of law, Asharite tradition of theology and Sufism as part of the larger 
madhhab system. Although the choice for the Malikite school of law was 
made clear, lecturers of both mosques stressed the point of the legitimacy 
of following one of the other three schools of law. Al-Bakkali stated that 
“You will never reach the truth as only God is the Truth. As a Malikite, I 
believe our view on Islamic issues, but I also know that another school 
could be correct. That is what “Allāhu a’lam”186 means.” Mokadmi of Imam 
Malik said that “It does not matter which madhhab you follow, as long as 
you follow one.”187 This last point was underlined by the fact that Mokadmi 
often mentioned the Hanafite position on religious issues. “You follow Abū 
Ḥanīfa, right?” while pointing at a student, “Yes, the same [religious 
principle] goes for you.”188 This demonstrates that the concept of unity of 
belief is less important compared to the value of differences of opinion, as 
long as one stays within the four schools of law. In another instance, 
Mokadmi did express slight disapproval of one the schools of law. After a 
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question of a student, Mokadmi stated that of all four schools of law, the 
Hanbali is the odd one.189 This may either refer to the occasional Hanbalite 
disapproval of Sufism and established principles of the Asharite and 
Maturidite schools of theology.190 Or it may also refer to the Hanbalite 
connection to Salafism and –particularly – Wahhabism, which clearly 
denounces Sufism. 191  Again, it suggests that the belief in the general 
madhhab traditionalism of all four schools of law is set up against the 
disapproval of Salafism. This is very much underlined by Al-Bakkali’s 
opinion on the matter: “Following a school of law is important. Not following 
one means that you are following Salafism. And Salafism means trouble. 
Everywhere where it is, Salafism brings trouble. […] Following a school of 
law goes against the influence of Saudi-Arabia and the influence of 
Salafism.”192 
 
Both mosques loosely defined what the Malikite school of law, 
Asharite tradition of theology and Sufism stand for. As said before, it is 
made clear that lecturers from both mosques place it within a larger 
framework of madhhabs. Mokadmi made several statements such as 
“according to our fiqh, the fiqh of imam Mālik, there is only one time in 
which the sunset-prayer may be performed. […]Ḥanafī fiqh says the 
same.”193 This is similar for El-Islam. In both mosques, lecturers highlighted 
all juridical matters from a Malikite perspective, while sometimes comparing 
it to other schools of law. During one class, Mokadmi stated that the 
Malikite school of law has a different ordering of fiqh sources. He mentioned 
a story about Anas ibn Mālik who believed that the arms should not be 
folded during ritual prayer, because he placed more authority on the lived 
sunna of the people of the city of Medina than in orally transmitted 
traditions on the same matter.194 Aarab of Imam Malik defined Sufism as  
“the science that concerns the acts of the heart and other matters like 
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sincerity.”195  Al-Bakkali defined it as half of the religion.196 However, none 
of the lecturers defined the Asharite tradition of theology, apart from 
confirming it was a part of the larger system and that it rejects Salafism’s 
anthropomorphism.197 
 
Category 2: Malikite, Asharite and Sufi schools 
 
Lecturers of both mosques gave arguments for why to follow a 
madhhab, without extensively addressing the choice for the specific Malikite 
school of law. On this matter, lecturers of El-Islam were generally more 
outspoken, although Imam Malik also mentioned similar arguments on 
following madhhabs several times.  
 
You need to understand a madhhab before you can understand Quran 
and sunna. Without it, you will never understand sharia. It is 
comparable with biology and the study of cells: You cannot just look 
at the cells with the naked eye; you need a microscope in order to 
draw conclusions. The same goes for Islam. You need a madhhab in 
order to be able to approach sharia.198 
 
The quote demonstrates that the lecturer is of the opinion that Islam can 
only be approached through accepting the authority of a school of law. By 
comparing it to biology, he is claiming that followers of madhhab 
traditionalism have the tools to approach the truth, suggesting that those 
that do not use a school of law are, in effect, uninformed and unequipped. 
 
 Lecturers of both mosques mentioned another argument on the 
authority of schools of law. Their argument is that following a school of law 
is equal to following the infallibility of the consensus of religious scholars 
through history or the umma: 
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‘ulamā’’ have been able to form ijmā’ [religious consensus] over the 
authority of the maddhabs for over a thousand years. As Muslims, it 
is our duty to follow the consensus of the umma. Since the 
messenger – peace be upon him – has transmitted to Abū Dawūd 
that ‘Allah will not cause my umma to agree on misguidance.’ The 
umma is infallible.199  
  
The lecturer of El-Islam reported a similar argument: “Most Muslims have 
always accepted the framework of these [four] imams.”200  Mokadmi of 
Imam Malik uses a deductive argument in combination with a prophetic 
tradition. It demonstrates that both theology and a historical narrative are 
used to make evident that the true authority lies with the four schools of 
law. 
 
The lecturer of Imam Malik, Said Mokadmi, also justifies the authority 
of the schools of law by stating that religious scholars are experts on 
religion and that ‘regular’ believers should therefore rely on them.  
 
These days we have developed a so-called critical academic way of 
thinking. Now we think that we are all able to draw conclusions about 
the Quran and sunna. But we do not have the capability. And some 
say “yes, but I have a hadith that says the opposite.” Do you really 
think that these scholars do not know this hadith? […] We do not 
treat our [medical] doctors like that. We respect their expertise. Why 
can we not do the same with our scholars?201 
 
This means that, in terms of religious knowledge, scholars have an elevated 
position of expertise that should be recognized and followed.  He is pointing 
out that some draw religious conclusions, without having studied for it. He 
equates producing Islamic knowledge with producing knowledge on any 
scientific domain, in which only the experts have the rights and means to 
form religious conclusions.  
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 Lecturers from both mosques also gave arguments for following 
Sufism, as an essential part of Islam. During several lectures, the lecturers 
stated that it is impossible to be a true good Muslim without incorporating 
Sufism. The lecturer of Imam Malik, Mohammed Aarab, defined Sufism to 
be “the science that concerns the acts of the heart and other matters like 
sincerity.”202  Al-Bakkali, from El-Islam stated: 
 
Sufism supports following the fiqh. Therefore Sufism is essential. The 
one who either neglects Sufism or the fiqh, loses half of the 
religion.203 
 
On another instance, a lecturer of El-Islam claimed that “if a person has no 
[Sufi] shaykh, Shayt ̣ān will become his shaykh.”204 After that, he quoted the 
Quranic verse “Then We placed thee upon a clear path from the Command; 
so follow it, and follow not the caprices of those who know.”205 Historically, 
a majority of the Muslim scholars interpreted “the path” in this verse as one 
that leads to the truth on which God has placed the prophet Mohammed, as 
opposed to the path on which God has placed the Israelites.206 In this 
instance, the speaker aimed to back up his claim about the importance of 
following the path of Sufi masters. He did so by mentioning this Quranic 
verse, in which ‘path’ or ‘sharī’ ’ may be interpreted as the Sufi path of the 
Master. Additionally, this verse highlights the authority of scholars, by 
disapproving of following those without knowledge.  
 
The lecturers of El-Islam mentioned that they followed the Asharite 
tradition of theology without specifying arguments. Imam Malik, however, 
gave arguments for following the Asharite tradition of theology. It stressed 
the rejection of the idea of anthropomorphism of God several times, 
concerning matters of theology: 
 
                                                
202 Mohamed Aarab, Islamitisch Centrum Imam Malik, Lecture “De Wetenschap van de Tasawwuf”, 
August 27, 2016. 
203 Alkhammar Al-Bakkali, Masjid El-Islam, Lecture “Methode van de Ahlu s-sunna,” November 13, 2016. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Q 45:18 
Translation from: Seyyed Hossein Nasr (editor), The Study Quran: A New Translation and Commentary 
(San Francisco: HarperOne, 2015), 1220. 
206 Ibid, 1220. 
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The Salafi scholar ibn ‘Uthaymayn says that Allah the Exalted runs 
from location to location. […] Astaghfirullah.[ 207 ] May Allah the 
Exalted protect our umma from these h ̣ashwiyya[208] whose way of 
thinking is equal to switching off the good sense. The Ash’aris, like all 
Sunni’s, have winnowed the wheat from the chaff for centuries on the 
basis of established principles.209 
 
This quote demonstrates that following the Asharite tradition of theology is 
(1) set off against believing in the theology of Salafism, (2) holds religious 
authority because Asharite scholars have been forming religious opinions for 
centuries, (3) part of Sunni Islam and (4) based on established principles. 
In the case of El-Islam, the arguments are less clear, since they are largely 
omitted. This omission suggests that there is certain self-evidence to 
following the Asharite tradition of theology. Nevertheless, Al-Bakkali 
mentioned, one time, that followers of the Hanafite school of law generally 
follow the Maturidite school of theology whilst followers of the Malikite 
school of law follow the Asharite tradition of theology. He added that there 
is not a lot of difference between these two schools.210  This suggests that 
belief in the Asharite principles follows from adherence to the Malikite 
school of law and is therefore also based on matters of Moroccan identity. 
This would support the point of its self-evidence. 
 
 Lecturers of both mosques also argued that a Muslim should follow a 
school of law, because the alternative – Salafism – is the ‘wrong’ way of 
practicing. Following a school of law is outspokenly presented as the only 
Sunni Islam in both mosques.211 This means that if a believer would not 
accept the religious authority of one of the four schools of law, the mosques 
do not consider the individual as a Sunni Muslim. It suggests that the 
mosques aim to claim the historical term Sunni or Ahl al-sunna in order to 
coin or define themselves as opposed to non-Sunni’s. Through it, the 
                                                
207 An Arabic term in the tenth stem of GH-F-R which has the meaning here of “I seek the forgiveness of 
God”. The term is also often used to express indignation for the sins of another Muslim individual. 
208 A pejorative historical term that is often used for a group of people that are accused of being literalist 
in their interpretation of Islam.  
209 Lecture “Islam en sektes deel 1.” 
210 Lecture “Kennis in de Islam.”  
211 Course “Aqidah en Fiqh.” 
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discourses in the mosques specify their doctrine as belonging to the 
genealogy of Sunni tradition, which entails the idea that it is the only 
branch of Islam which truly follows the sunna of the prophet and that the 
other Islamic branches have introduced bid’a - or forbidden religious 
innovations. In many ways, the vocal expression of belonging to the true 
Sunni’s relates to a battle against the influence of Salafism.212 Mokadmi and 
Al-Bakkali have both used terms like Sunni Islam or Ahl as-sunna as 
opposed to ‘h ̣ashwiyya’, ‘Kharijites’ and ‘pseudo-Salafists’. 213  It 
demonstrates how part of the school of law doctrine, in the case of these 
two mosques, is characterized by being a part of a counter narrative against 
Salafism.  
 
 The lecturers of both mosques gave other arguments for rejecting 
Salafism, too. Al-Bakkali stated that Salafists do not make use of ‘ijāza214 – 
the concept that Islamic knowledge is transmitted through a chain of 
transmitters that go back to the first transmitter or author.215 He continued 
that “they claim the salaf, but this is not true. We follow the salaf, because 
our chain goes back to them.”216 On another instance, Al-Bakkali framed 
Salafism as a viral disease and as a religion for the illiterate: “Salafism: 
That is a disease spreading through society, because of a lack of 
knowledge.”217 The framing of Salafism as a viral disease implies that he 
compares it to a foreign organism that invades domestic cells and destroys 
or damages them. Applying this image to reality, in Al-Bakkali’s 
understanding, Salafism is a foreign, external phenomenon that damages or 
destroys the Islam he identifies with, all the while aggressively spreading. 
He added that countries that follow a school of law do not experience the 
                                                
212 The idea of claiming the banner of Sunni Islam seems te be part of a larger global movement to 
define as a group as opposed to the group of Salafism. It is especially demonstrated during a conference 
on the 25th of August, 2016, during which scholars defined the term of Ahl as-sunna against Salafists. 
See statement of the conference: 
“Chechnya Conference Statement,” Chechnya Conference, accessed on May 1, 2017, 
http://chechnyaconference.org/material/chechnya-conference-statement-english.pdf. 
213 Lecture “Islam en sektes deel 1”; 
Course “Aqidah en Fiqh”; 
Lecture “Methode van de Ahlu s-sunna”. 
214 Lecture “Methode van de Ahlu s-sunna.”  
215 G. Vajda et al., “Id ̲j ̲āza,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, edited by P. Bearman et al., 
accessed online on May 2, 2017. 
216 Lecture “Methode van de Ahlu s-sunna.”  
217 Ibid. 
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same problems. He gave the example of Turkey.218 During another talk Al-
Bakkali stated that “we have always celebrated the messenger’s birthday. 
[…] Then, Salafis come and tell us that it is shirk [idolatry] and bid’a. We 
have always celebrated! They say that they have come to purify Islam. 
Instead, they mutilate the religion.” 219  In both statements, Al-Bakkali 
defines Salafism as the evildoer and as deviating from his religious 
standards. The first statement, referring to problems in states because of 
Salafism, suggests that he connects the branch to terrorism and other 
political issues of the state. 
 
 The lecturer of Imam Malik was subtler on issues around schools of 
law versus Salafism. The lecturer would roll his eyes while declaring with a 
sigh “I can guess where this idea comes from,” when a student would ask a 
critical question on the permissibility of the issue of visiting graves of 
saints. 220  On another instance he compared Salafists to “those 
extremists”. 221  He also mentioned how Salafists aim for sharia in the 
Netherlands, whilst there is more Sharia already in the Netherlands 
compared to Saudi-Arabia. Lastly, he stated during a lecture that “Only 
followers from a school of law follow the truth. The rest of them are 
strayed.”222 By saying this, he specifically excludes those who do not follow 
a school of law, by which he seems to mean Salafists. Although he does not 
link Salafism as explicitly to terrorism as Al-Bakkali, he does frame it as the 
branch that stands for the idea that Sharia and the Netherlands are 
irreconcilable. 
 
Category 3: Relation between Islam and national identity 
 
Lecturers of both mosques also addressed briefly how following the 
Malikite school of law converged with the national identity. Apart from 
endorsing the larger system of madhhab traditionalism, both mosques 
identify with the Malikite school of law and the Asharite tradition of theology 
                                                
218 Lecture “Methode van de Ahlu s-sunna.”  
219 Ibid. 
220 Course “Aqidah en Fiqh.” 
Lecture “Methode van de Ahlu s-sunna.”  
221 Course “Aqidah en Fiqh.” 
222 Lecture “Islam en sektes deel 1.” 
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for particular reasons. First and foremost, both have stated that the 
Moroccan origin is the most important factor for choosing these particular 
schools of law. Al-Bakkali stated that “it is our culture and our history and 
our origin to follow the madhhab of Anas ibn Mālik and those who came 
after him.”223 In Imam Malik, the lecturer Said Mokadmi said “you can 
choose any madhhab you like, but the Malikite madhhab is what our 
[Moroccan] community follows. So we follow it, too.”224 Later, while still 
discussing the Malikite traditions, he added that “a believer has little to do 
with the politics of Morocco.”225  This implies that a “Moroccan” Muslim 
should not choose the Malikite school of law due to the state’s opinion on 
Islam or even the Commandership of the Faithful. First and foremost, this 
shows that the choice for this particular school of law is determined on the 
basis of which national or ethnic community the mosque belongs to, based 
on traditions passed on by generations. It suggests that the choice of the 
school of law depends on matters of identity that are divorced from 
Morocco’s polities and politics. Their Dutch identity and nationality also play 
an important role in this: By belonging to the Dutch nation – through 
nationality or identity - the Moroccan Dutch community does not form a 
part of a religious community in which religion and national boundaries 
coincide. As a result, they form new ideas about belonging to a larger 
Muslim community. The search for Moroccan traditions, while rejecting 
Moroccan state authority, demonstrates this remodeling of the idea of the 
larger Muslim community separated from ‘old’ national boundaries, while at 
the same time Dutch Moroccan nationals experience a need for 
‘recognizable’ and ‘safe’ tradition that they do not find in the Netherlands. 
 
Category 4: Commandership of the Faithful 
 
 In both mosques, the issue of the Commandership of the Faithful was 
not addressed at all. This suggests either that they do not recognize the 
Moroccan king’s Commandership of the Faithful over Moroccan Muslims or 
that they do not think it relevant for the group they are speaking to. It may 
                                                
223 Lecture “Methode van de Ahlu s-sunna.”  
224 Lecture “Islam en sektes deel 1.” 
225 Ibid. 
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also be correlated with Mokadmi’s statement on refraining from Moroccan 
state politics when it comes to Islam. Both Al-Bakkali and Mokadmi have 
discussed the importance of scholarly authority on religious issues a great 
deal, while omitting statements on the king’s religious authority. This 
implies that they place more authority in religious scholars, than they do in 
the Moroccan king.  
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis aimed at investigating the (dis)similarities in the 
discourses used by the Moroccan government and two Morocco-affiliated 
mosques in advocating madhhab traditionalism. In both discourses, I 
researched four categories: (1) how the Malakite school of law, the Asharite 
tradition of theology and Sufism are being defined; (2) the arguments used 
for the necessity of following the Malakite school of law, the Asharite 
tradition of theology and Sufism; (3) how the discourse articulated the 
relationship between the Moroccan national identity and these three Islamic 
traditions and (4) how the king’s position as political and religious leader or 
Commander of the Faithful is being discussed.  
 
Category 1: Definition of Islam 
 
Moroccan State Mosques 
- Islam is peace, tolerance and 
modern. It is not extremist 
and violent. 
- Islam is a cultural force, 
specific for the Moroccan 
culture and nation and 
enforcing the unity of the 
Moroccan nation. 
- Islam is a religious identity 
and civilizational heritage 
- MAS 226  is part of a larger 
madhhab system. 
- Malikite school of law – or any 
other - is a necessary tool to 
be able to come to valid 
juridical conclusions. 
- Sufism is the science that 
concerns the heart; Sufism is 
half the religion. 
- Asharite tradition of theology 
rejects anthropomorphism. 
Table 1 
 
 In both discourses, Islam or the Malikite, Asharite, Sufi approach to it 
are defined differently. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments and 
the King have constantly stressed how Islam is a religion of peace and 
                                                
226 MAS stands for the combination of following Malikite school of law, the Asharite tradition of theology 
and Sufism. 
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tolerance and is not extremist. The mosques in the Netherlands have not 
defined Islam in the same way. In fact, they have not defined Islam at all, 
assuming that they already agree with their audience (mosque attendees) 
about what Islam is. On the other hand, the Moroccan state’s context 
influences its discourse on Islam, because it is informed by the larger 
debate on Islam, security and the War on Terror. This suggest that the 
Moroccan state is reacting to this debate by producing a counter narrative 
through which it aims to produce a discursive truth about what Islam 
entails.  
 
 Another difference between the two discourses on definitions is that 
the Moroccan state approaches Islam as a Moroccan cultural force that is 
able to guide Moroccans into a state of political and cultural unity. On the 
other hand, the mosques only provide a theological definition and place 
their religious tradition in a broader religious methodology that is not 
specific for Morocco. They legitimize their belief in Islam from Morocco 
through this larger system of madhhabs, whilst calling upon a more 
universalistic identity instead of one that is defined by Moroccan state 
boundaries. Morocco does the exact opposite. It justifies the adherence to 
these Islamic traditions by calling upon national boundaries and national 
heritage. This is underlined by that they refrain completely from explaining 
their audience what they entail except as a cultural force or heritage. 
 
Category 2: Malikite, Asharite and Sufi schools 
 
Moroccan State Mosques 
- MAS is the antithesis and 
solution for extremism and 
political Islam. 
- MAS is the only flawless 
approach of the sunna. 
- Sufism is apolitical and 
therefore peaceful. A true 
believer should give up 
worldly rewards. 
- MAS is part of Morocco’s 
immutable values. 
- A madhhab is the only way to 
approach the Quran and 
sunna. It is the only right 
tool. 
- Madhhabs are infallible, 
because they have consensus 
throughout the history of the 
umma. 
- Scholars of madhhabs have 
expertise and expertise 
should be respected. 
- Sufism is essential in order to 
be sincere. 
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- One should follow the 
Asharite school of law, 
because it is the antithesis of 
Salafism and because it is 
part of the madhhab tradition. 
- One should follow a madhhab, 
because the alternative – 
Salafism – is deviated, 
extremist and cause 
problems. 
Table 2 
 
 
When it comes to the arguments used for the justification of following 
the Malikite school of law, Asharite tradition of theology and Sufism, both 
discourses depend on a completely different approach. According to the 
Moroccan discourse, one should follow these three traditions because it is 
the antithesis and solution for Islamic extremism and political Islam. Sufism 
is apolitical and peaceful. Following these three traditions is what is 
expected of you as a Moroccan, because it is part of your identity and 
heritage. All of this suggests an authoritarian move to strengthen the ability 
of the king and his government to influence the ideas of the Moroccan 
citizens. He does not promote Islam in general, but only how Islam “should” 
be practiced along national boundaries according to him and his 
government. He puts Moroccan traditions and Sufism forward and 
emphasizes them, whilst opposing it to anyone who does not accept the 
Malikite, Asharite and Sufi version of Islam. The mosques in the 
Netherlands are not under the direct influence of Morocco’s authoritarian 
institutionalization of all religious affairs and are largely part of a different 
national debate, in which the Dutch government largely refrains from 
engaging in debates about Islam.227 However, as in Morocco, the discourse 
is similarly informed by debates that connect Islam with security issues. 
                                                
227 This principle of the secular model is slightly under pressure with the emergence of the debates on 
whether Salafism should be legally forbidden. (See: Ineke Roex, Sjef van Stiphout & Jean Tillie, 
Salafisme in Nederland: Aard, omvang en dreiging, Instituut voor Migratie- en Etnische Studies, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam & Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek (2010): 1-3, 233-258; 
“Salafisme,” Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, accessed on July 17, 2016, 
https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen_a_z/salafisme/index.aspx; 
“Kabinet wil salafisme niet verbieden,” NOS, accessed on July 17, 2016, http://nos.nl/artikel/2089037-
kabinet-wil-salafisme-niet-verbieden.html; 
“Invloed ultraorthodoxe moslims in moskee groeit,” NRC, accessed on July 17, 2016, 
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/04/17/invloed-ultraorthodoxe-moslims-in-moskee-groeit-a1416983; 
 “Dreiginsbeleid Terrorisme Nederland 42.”) 
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Although the Moroccan Dutch mosques do not have a government that tell 
them what ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Islam is, they are informed by the same idea 
that Salafism is connected with terrorism and extremism.  
 
Category 3: Relation between Islam and national identity  
 
Moroccan State Mosques 
- Morocco is unique because of 
its culture and religion. 
- Islam is divided along national 
lines. The Moroccan Islam is 
specific for Moroccans and it 
cannot be changed. 
- Islam is the unifying force of 
the Moroccan nation. 
- Morocco as a nation is 
divinely chosen. 
- Moroccan national Islam is 
able to fight non-Moroccan 
forms of Islam, which cause 
instability. 
- One can follow any madhhab, 
but the Malikite school of law 
is what the Moroccan 
community should adhere to, 
because that is the tradition. 
- One should stay away from 
Moroccan politics and 
Moroccan state Islam. 
Table 3 
 
 
 In both discourses, Islam and the Moroccan identity overlap. The 
mosques state that a Moroccan Dutch attendee may follow any school of 
law, but that it is advisable to follow the one that the Moroccan community 
follows. They associate it with recognition and security. At the same time, 
one of the lecturers has stated that one should stay away from Moroccan 
national politics when it comes to Islam. This suggests that the lecturers of 
the mosques in the Netherlands think along the lines of a global Islam that 
is not divided per se by Moroccan national lines. Their Dutch identity and 
nationality also play an important role in this, because they are no longer 
part of a religious community in which religion and national boundaries 
coincide. The rejection of the Morocco’s state Islam exclusively for Moroccan 
nationals goes against this development. As a result, - combined with the 
the desire to follow recognizable and ‘secure’ traditions - mosques reject 
Moroccan state interference, while actively preaching Islam from Morocco.  
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Category 4: Commandership of the Faithful 
 
Moroccan State Mosques 
- The Commander preserves 
national unity. 
- The Commander ensures 
stability. 
- The Commander serves as the 
highest Sufi master and 
religious authority of the 
Moroccan nation. 
- The Commander is granted 
authority because of his 
prophetic descent. 
- The Commander endorses 
Sufi orders, and Sufi’s grant 
him loyalty. 
- The Commandership of the 
Faithful is not addressed at 
all. 
- The lecturers have only 
spoken of the authority of 
religious scholars. 
Table 4 
 
 When it comes to the subject of the king’s Commandership of the 
Faithful, it is safe to say that the discourses show no similarities. The 
Moroccan king and Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments constantly 
stress how it is a symbol of national unity, how it ensures political stability 
and how it holds the highest religious and political authority in the country. 
The mosques, on the other hand, have not mentioned the Commandership 
at all. The lecturers have only spoken about the value of the authority of 
religious scholars and how one should refrain from Morocco’s politics. This 
suggests that in the case of the discourse in the Netherlands religious 
scholars have largely replaced the religious authority of the king. 
 
Conclusive Remarks 
 
As demonstrated by comparing the discourses of the Moroccan state 
and those of two mosques with Moroccan attendees in the Netherlands, 
both promote the same kind of madhhab traditionalism, but use it for 
different purposes. Both discourses entail that Islam and Moroccan origin or 
nationality overlap. The difference lies in that the state discourse aims to 
attain political and religious unity for the Moroccan nation through official 
Moroccan Islam, while accepting the king’s authority. The mosques seek 
Islam from Morocco because they associate it with recognition and security, 
but reject official Moroccan Islam, because they do not trust the state’s 
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good intentions. In both cases, the discourses are informed by debates that 
inextricably link Islam with security. In both cases, Salafism is perceived as 
the opposition and cause of extremism. However, both parties handle this 
idea differently. In the ‘minds’ of both discourses, this means that following 
the ‘right’ Islam brings forth political stability and maintained power in the 
Moroccan case and less ‘problems’ in the Moroccan Dutch case.  
 
Both the Moroccan state and the two mosques are joined in the same 
struggle for the return of the authority of the religious scholars and 
madhhabs. Yet, they both have different points of departure. The aim of the 
Moroccan state was to establish political and religious unity for the 
Moroccan nation. It therefore selectively approaches madhhab 
traditionalism in order to define and justify an Islam that coincides with its 
national boundaries. The religious identity of the Moroccan citizen coincides 
with its cultural identity, as the Commandership of the Faithful unites 
political and religious authority. Consequently, the Moroccan discourse 
attributes authority to madhhab traditionalism, only because it is part of 
Morocco’s culture and identity. On the other hand, the discourses in the two 
mosque in the Netherlands developed out of a different context. They 
support the wider system madhhab traditionalism on the basis of theological 
arguments instead of cultural heritage. They follow the Malikite traditions 
because of their Moroccan identity, but approve following any kind of 
madhhab. This illustrates that they do not identify with a Muslim community 
on the basis of national boundaries, but on the basis of a universalistic 
Muslim identity in which space is given to their own cultural religious 
heritage and those of others. 
 
 Although the Moroccan Dutch community is perceived as being part 
of a monolithic “Moroccannes” without much “Dutchness”, the studied 
discourses suggest that the Moroccan Dutch experience of Islam is very 
much marked by the Dutch context and the different interests at stake. For 
the Moroccan discourse, the concept of unity of Islam is central, while the 
Moroccan Dutch recognize the value of diversity within madhhab 
traditionalism. Both the mosques and the Moroccan state are involved in the 
promotion of madhhab traditionalism and against the religious influence of a 
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phenomenon that can loosely be labeled as a cluster of Salafism, 
Wahhabism and Jihadism. Nevertheless, the discourses demonstrate that 
Islam in these two mosques is largely divorced from the Moroccan context 
and shaped by migration, debates on security, “Good” and “Bad” Islam, 
debates in Dutch society and the desire for an Islam that fits their needs 
and traditions. The fact that the Moroccan Dutch live outside of juridical 
influence of the Moroccan state puts them in the luxury position of being 
able to selectively choose the elements of diverse religious phenomenon in 
Morocco or official Moroccan Islam.  
 
Comparing religious discourses in the mosques of Moroccan Dutch 
nationals to those of the state of the country of origin has given us the 
opportunity to see what the differences are. This is also because mosques 
are places where (parts of) religious identities are shaped. This thesis has 
approached the subject of the discourses in mosques not in terms of 
platforms of radicalization or claims of the public space, but as an important 
site that produces discourses through which we can identify how a 
community relates itself to the country of origin. This concept challenges 
dichotomical ideas of Europe versus Islam and demonstrates how the 
Moroccan Dutch community can identify with several places, communities 
and societies at the same time. 
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